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COURT CONGESTION AND CRASH PROGRAMS:
A CASE STUDY
By GRESHAM M. SYKES*
AND
MICHAEL ISBELL**
Court congestion, and the resultant serious time lapse between
filing of pleadings and trial of civil cases, has been for years a major
problem of both state and federal court systems. The Federal Dis-
trict Courts in particular face a growing backlog of pending civil
cases. In the spring of 1966 the United States District Court for
the District of Colorado conducted an intensive six-week program
designed to reduce the Court's backlog. The operation and effects
of the program were studied by the Administration of Justice Pro-
gram of the College of Law at the University of Denver. Professor
Sykes and Mr. Isbell report the findings of this study and examine
the question of whether judicial manpower might have been more
efficiently employed during the program. The Court must continue
to experiment with small, tentative changes, and systematically
evaluate the effectiveness of the changes, if remedies for congestion
are to be found. These experiments might be directed at such goals
as more accurate estimation of length of trials, more precise pre-
diction of which cases will be settled out of court, and more effi-
cient management of judicial time for performing nontrial duties.
DELAY in court has long been viewed as a serious defect dog-
ging our legal system, and over the years society has attempted
to cure it with a variety of remedies. Yet despite the imagination
and effort devoted to getting rid of this malaise of the law, it
appears that we are not much better off than we were 60 years ago
when Roscoe Pound delivered his address on "The Causes of Pop-
ular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice" at the annual
meeting of the American Bar Association in 1906.1 Court congestion
is still a critical social problem, a basic threat to legal rights, and a
major weakness of our tribunals.
The United States District Courts have suffered from this diffi-
culty along with the variety of state courts. In recent years, however,
the situation in state courts appears to have improved while the
situation in Federal District Courts has grown worse; and the need
*Professor of Law and Social Science, College of Law, University of Denver.
*"Member of the Colorado Bar; A.B., University of Colorado, 1964; J.D., University
of Denver, 1966.
1 Repvinted in 8 BAYLOR L. REV. 1 (1956).
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for effective remedial action in the Federal system has become ever
more pressing. Between 1960 and 1965, civil cases filed in all
United States District Courts increased approximately 17%, from
57,791 cases to 67,678 cases. Although the percentage of cases termi-
nated also increased during this period, cases were still coming into
the courts at a faster rate than they could be disposed of. As a con-
sequence, the backlog of cases grew from 61,251 in 1960 to 74,395
in 1965. The United States District Courts, despite the fact that
they had increased the rate of disposition between 1960 and 1965,
were being confronted with increasing congestion.'
A part of the increase in filings can be attributed, of course,
to the increase in the population in the United States which went
from some 181 million in 1960 to 195 million in 1965, a growth of
about 8%. Since the United States Census Bureau has estimated that
the population may very probably grow to 380 million by the year
2010, approximately double the 1960 figure, it is clear that the
courts will undoubtedly be faced with a greatly expanded work load
which cannot be solved by minor tinkering with the system.'
On July 1, 1964, the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Colorado, (hereinafter referred to as the Colorado U.S. Dis-
trict Court) had a backlog of 426 civil cases pending. During the
ensuing fiscal year, 586 new cases were filed and 518 cases were
terminated, increasing the backlog to 494 cases - a growth of
about 16%. At this rate, the backlog of the Colorado U.S. District
Court would double in six or seven years, although, fortunately, it
would still not approach the staggering burden of the Southern Dis-
trict of New York (10,180 civil cases pending, July 1, 1964), East-
ern District of Pennsylvania (5,287 cases pending), or Eastern
District of Louisiana (3,952 cases pending) .4
In 1965 the Colorado U.S. District Court ranked very near the
midpoint for all United States District Courts in terms of the amount
2 See REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.,
DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS ANN. REP.
(1965). See generally Lagging Justice, 328 ANNALS (1960).
3 The projections vary between 438 million and 322 million, depending on different
assumptions concerning the birth rate. J. SIEGEL, M. ZITTER, & D. AKERS, PROJEC-
TIONS OF THE POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES, BY AGE AND SEX: 1964 TO 1985,
WITH EXTENSIONS TO 2010, at 55 (U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population
Rep., Ser. P-25, Pub. No. 286, 1964). Projections for Colorado for the year 2010 are
not available, but the Bureau of the Census has made estimates for 1985, ranging
from 2,971,000 to 2,726,000. Since Colorado had a population of 1,754,000 in 1960,
this could well mean an increase of about 65% in 25 years. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REP., SER. P-25, PUB. No. 326, ILLUSTRATIVE PRO-
JECTIONS OF THE POPULATION OF THE STATES: 1970 TO 1985, at 14-15 (1966).
REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 2, at 174-
75, app. table Cl.
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of time between a case being "at issue" and coming to trial.5 This fact,
however, must be interpreted with caution. A premature compla-
cency about dealing with delay with apparently somewhat greater
efficiency than many United States District Courts may be mislead-
ing, since Colorado's slightly better performance may be due, at
least in part, to the types of cases filed and the relatively lower fre-
quency of jury trials, rather than to greater efficiency in administra-
tive procedures.
The distribution of types of cases filed in the Colorado U.S.
District Court differs slightly from the distribution of cases filed in
all United States District Courts. There is a somewhat larger per-
centage of contract actions and a somewhat smaller percentage of
tort actions in Colorado; and since, in general, contract actions
require less trial time than tort actions, the difference in the types
of cases filed may help explain Colorado's slight edge in the number
of months between cases "at issue" and trial -a median of 10
months in Colorado compared to approximately 11 months for all
Federal District Courts. In addition, in the Colorado U. S. District
Court there are relatively fewer jury trials in civil and criminal cases,
and this, too, may help to speed the judicial process.'
I. THE CRASH PROGRAM - OBJECTIVES AND RESULTS
In any event, a desire to better the situation prompted the
Court, under the direction of Chief Judge Alfred A. Arraj, to under-
take an intensive six-week program to see what could be done about
the growing number of cases awaiting court action. From the middle
of April 1966, to the end of May 1966, two judges trying cases five
days a week were to be added to the Court's normal complement of
three judges.7
In order to determine the effect of the program (which one
newspaper termed rather dramatically a "massive assault on the
backlog"), the Court invited the Administration of Justice Program
of the College of Law at the University of Denver to study its
5 As Milton Green has pointed out, "Considerable difficulty is encountered in ascribing
a precise meaning to the term 'at issue.' " We are using it here, as Green suggests,
to refer to
the status of a case when final pleadings on both sides have been filed and
preliminary motions have been disposed of. In some jurisdictions, however,
the term is used in a different sense. For instance, in New Jersey a case is
considered "at issue" when the first answering pleading is filed, whereas in
New York a case is not considered "at issue" until the pleadings have been
completed, all preliminary motions made and determined, and a certificate
filed by the attorneys indicating that the case is ready for trial.
Green, The Situation in 1959, in Lagging justice, 328 ANNALS 7, 9 n.7 (1960).
6
REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 2, at 204.
7 The additional judicial manpower was to be drawn from Federal District Courts in
other states, depending on the work load of these judges in their courts.
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operation during this period. 8 The Court started with 111 cases
which it intended to dispose of during the six-week period, in order
to reduce its backlog to more manageable proportions; and the out-
come of these cases was as follows:
Cases Disposed of Prior to the Crash Program
1 case went to trial before the crash program got under-
way and was disposed of by the Court;
1 case was disposed of before the crash program by a
default judgment;
1 case was disposed of before the crash program by a
summary judgment;
33 cases were settled out of court before the crash pro-
gram and thus did not require a trial.
Cases Disposed of During the Crash Program
29 cases were settled during the crash program (of these
29 cases, 7 involved a total of approximately 24 hours
of trial time as a part of the process of settlement) ;
32 cases were completed by trial during the crash program
and were disposed of by the Court;
3 cases were disposed of by the Court during the crash
program by a summary judgment.
Cases Not Disposed of at the End of the Crash Program
7 cases were postponed for disposition, until after the end
of the crash program, at the request of the attorneys;
4 cases were not brought to trial during the crash pro-
gram, since further action by the Court was required or
settlements which had been reached required later
official approval.
It would appear, then, that by the end of the Colorado U.S.
District Court's crash program, 100 cases of its planned work load
of 111 cases, i.e. 90o, had been eliminated. In the sense that the
great share of the backlog represented by the cases scheduled for
this period was disposed of, the crash program could well be
acclaimed a success.
However, the following points should be noted:
First, 36 cases were disposed of before the crash program had
even begun. And of these 36 cases, 33 were settled out of court by
agreement between the parties and attorneys.
SThe Administration of Justice Program is financed primarily by a grant from the
Russell Sage Foundation and has as one of its major objectives the creation of closer
bonds between law and the social sciences. Special appreciation is to be expressed to
Michael Katch and Robert Minter, students at the College of Law, for their work in
the study, and to Mr. G. Walter Bowman and Mr. James Manspeaker of the Colorado
District Court for their cooperation.
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Second, 64 cases were disposed of during the crash program;
but of these 64 cases, 29 were settled by agreement between the
parties and attorneys.
In short - about one-third of the cases (32) were disposed of
by a trial verdict during the crash program.
It is possible that the 32 cases disposed of by trial during the
crash program represented a full work load for the judicial man-
power available in the six-week period. The original plan, which
scheduled more than three times this number for trial, might not be
as naive or overly optimistic as it may appear at first glance, since
the Court might have been operating with a well-reasoned expecta-
tion born of long experience that most cases scheduled for trial will
not come to trial in fact. Indeed, the act of scheduling a case for
trial may increase the chances of settlement, making a trial unneces-
sary: explicitly planning an event at a definite time and place makes
it unlikely that the event will occur.'
It is also possible, however, that the 32 cases disposed of by
trial during the crash program did not represent a full work load
for the judicial manpower available in the six-week period. If this
were true - if the judges had trial time they were not using - and
if additional cases for trial had been available to be substituted for
those which had been settled out of court, the total number of cases
disposed of both by trial and settlement could have been far greater.
If we assume, for example, that (1) the Court had tried and dis-
posed of 32 cases as scheduled; (2) 62 cases had been disposed of
by settlement out of court; and (3) 62 additional cases had been
substituted for those settled and these additional cases had been
brought to trial; then, the Court could have disposed of 156 cases
- approximately 41% more dispositions than originally conceived
by the crash program. The crucial question, then, is whether the
judicial manpower of the Court was fully employed in taking
care of the 32 cases disposed of by trial and whether additional cases
could have been substituted for those disposed of by settlement.
9 If a case has definitely been scheduled for trial, settlement may become more likely
because the uncertainties of trial outcome loom larger in the minds of attorneys and
a settlement becomes preferable. It is also possible that full, detailed work on a case,
on the part of attorneys, may be delayed until it seems certain that a case will go to
trial. As this process comes into play, a basis for a mutually acceptable settlement is
more likely to emerge and a trial becomes unnecessary. Robert Merton has analyzed
the phenomenon of the self-fulfilling prophecy in which the prediction of an event
makes its occurrence more likely. See R. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL
STRUCTURE (1949). We seem to be dealing here with the phenomenon of the sell-
defeating prophecy.
Whether the "rush to settlement" under the threat of an impending trial results
in more just settlements remains an unexplored issue.
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II. TRIAL CALENDARS - PREDICTING LENGTH OF TRIALS
The actual length of the judge's working day has, of course,
been subject to much popular debate - and to much misunderstand-
ing. Time spent in trial is in fact only one portion of the judge's
work and much effort must be devoted to hearing motions, writing
decisions, keeping abreast of the legal literature, pre-trial confer-
ences, et cetera. Furthermore, as one writer has pointed out, "judges
are not ordinary employees and the problem of delay in court, if the
judiciary is to retain its dignity and independence, is not simply one
of time-clock efficiency."' 0
Under the crash program, four days of each week were to be
devoted to the trial of cases for the three regular judges of the
Colorado U.S. District Court. The fifth day of the week was to be
set aside for other judicial duties such as those mentioned above.
Thus, the regular judges were to provide a total of 72 days avail-
able for the trial of cases during the six-week crash program. As far
as the visiting jurists were concerned, each was to spend five days a
week on the trial of cases, providing a total of 60 additional days
available for trial work. The entire number of trial days available
to the Court, then, during the crash program would in theory amount
to 132 days.
Now in setting cases for trial, it is necessary for the Court to
predict as accurately as possible the length of time each case is ex-
pected to take, so that a rational calendar of cases can be estab-
lished."1 The predicted lengths of trial for the cases in the crash
program were as follows:
Total Predicted Days of
Type of Case Number Trial Time Required
Contract 27 49.25
Tort 40 95.25
Actions under Statutes 42 112.00
Real Estate 2 1.50
Total 111 258.00
Since the Court had predicted that the total number of trial
days required for the cases in the crash program would amount to
258, it is evident that the Court could not possibly have completed
its work if its predictions for the length of cases were correct and
if all cases did in fact go to trial.
Such a massive discrepancy could be explained on several
grounds. First, it might be argued that the Court did not expect that
10 H. ZRISEL, H. KALVEN, & B. BUCHHOLz, DELAY IN THE COURT 14 (1959).
t These predicted lengths of trial are determined during the course of pre-trial confer.
ences, based on the evaluations of the attorneys and agreed to by the Court.
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all the cases in its crash program would actually go to trial but rather
that they would be settled before reaching the court or settled quickly
after the trial began. Since this is in fact what happened and seems
to be the common experience of the Court, we think it is likely that
the expectation of settlement was an important element in explain-
ing the Court's scheduling far more trial work than it could actually
accomplish.
Second, it is possible that the Court had knowingly accepted
overestimated trial times for the cases it had scheduled; and thus
its apparent excessive work load could actually have been disposed
of within the period of the crash program. The Court would need
far less than the 258 days it had predicted -it could accomplish
its duties in the 132 days available.
If we take the 32 cases actually tried, to get some information
on this last point, we find that the Court had based its plans on the
estimate that these cases would require a total of 77.5 days for their
disposition. If we assume that a judge spends an average of 6 hours
per day in the trial of cases, the 32 cases would have taken 465 hours
to complete." Li fact, these 32 cases were disposed of in some 292
hours.
In other words, the Court overestimated the time needed for its
trial work by a factor of about one and one-half - at least for those
cases actually reaching the trial stage."2
It is true, of course, that the flow of trial work is not continu-
ous and that a case which ends before its predicted half-day or full-
day mark leaves an awkward gap of several hours or more about
which little can be done as far as starting another case is concerned.
It makes little sense, after all, to begin a case at three o'clock in the
afternoon or to expect the parties to a case to present themselves
before the Court at a moment's notice. Nonetheless, it appears likely
that the predictions of length of trial were grossly inaccurate.
At the same time, the Court with its extra complement of judges
could have completed its disposition of 32 cases by trial in about
three and one-half weeks, even with these inaccuracies of prediction
about length of trial, if the Court had not been faced with unex-
pected settlements for which no substitute cases could be found in
time and which left large holes in the trial calendar.14 Without the
12 The number of hours per day a judge spends on trial work in the courtroom is highly
variable, depending on the press of other duties, gaps in the trial calendar, local
expectations about a "normal" working day, personal work habits, etc. On the whole,
however, the calculation of one day being equivalent to approximately six hours spent
in trial work on the average does not seem unreasonable. Cf. H. ZEISEL, H. KALVEN,
& B. BUCHHOLZ, supra note 10, ch. 16, at 181-89.
13 Of the 32 cases going to trial, only 4 cases took longer than expected.
14 The Court was able to schedule 14 additional cases which had not been a part of the
original planning for the crash program. Nine of these cases were disposed of before
the program ended and involved a total of approximately 52 hours of trial time.
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help of the additional judges, the 32 cases would have required
about six weeks and two days for their disposal. On the other hand,
if the Court had been more accurate in its predictions in the number
of days required for each case, and again assuming the Court had
not been left with gaps in its calendar by unexpected settlement, the
32 cases could have been disposed of in approximately two weeks
and one day. Without the help of the additional judges, the Court
would have needed four weeks and one day.
III. THE NEED FOR CONTINUED EXPERIMENTATION
The essential elements of the Colorado U.S. District Court's
crash program, then, can be summarized as follows: (1) the Court
attempted to eliminate 111 cases (about one-fifth of its backlog)
with 132 judge-days in a six-week period; (2) about one-third of
these cases were disposed of by trial and about two-thirds of these
cases were settled out of court, either before or during the crash
program; (3) approximately 50 judge-days were required for the
disposal of cases by trial; (4) about 10 judge-days were used for
the cases which had been added to the program;15 and (5) about
72 judge-days were left vacant, either because of gaps in the trial
calendar due to cases which had been settled or because trials took
less time than expected.
Since the Court had reserved 18 judge-days for judicial duties
other than trials, it would seem that the Court was left with a sur-
plus of some 72 judge-days which was not used with full effective-
ness - approximately the time of one judge working for about three
months. The question we must face is whether the Court could have
been more efficient in its operation.
There is, admittedly, no easy answer and any proposed solu-
tions must rest on a series of assumptions rather than demonstrated
fact. Let us assume, however, that 200 cases had been scheduled for
trial. If the ratio of cases settled to cases tried had remained the
same, approximately 130 cases would have been settled out of court
and 70 cases would have gone to trial. If these 70 cases had re-
quired an average of 1.5 days for trial (the average trial time
observed for cases in the crash program), slightly more than 100
judge-days would have been needed for their disposition. The num-
ber of cases eliminated from the backlog would almost have been
doubled.
Such a calendar of cases might seem much too venturesome. If
cases are not settled out of court as expected, the Court will face a
flood of irate attorneys who have been assured of a trial but for
15 See note 14 supra.
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whom no judge is available. Similarly, if cases tried take longer than
expected, the Court will find that its planned work exceeds its capa-
bilities. But the creation of a court calendar is a gamble, and the
administrators of the Court must strike a balance between being too
daring and too cautious. The temptation, of course, is to err on the
side of caution, since unused judge time is far less public, far less
likely to arouse the criticism of attorneys who have been promised
a trial which they do not get. Such caution, however, if carried too
far, is all too likely to aggravate the problem we are trying to cure
- namely, the problem of court congestion.
CONCLUSION
It is our opinion, then, that if more effective remedies are to be
found for reducing the backlog of the Court, the Court must recon-
sider its calendaring of cases and be more willing to experiment.
This does not mean that the Court needs to rush to extreme innova-
tions; small, tentative changes can be introduced, their effects evalu-
ated, and further changes fed into the system based on experience.
Three possibilities suggest themselves immediately. First, the
prediction of length of trial should be made more accurate. This
would require a careful examination of the factors which are now
being used (perhaps on'an intuitive basis) to estimate the length of
trial, prolonged and systematic comparisons of estimates and reality,
the discovery of new factors, and the creation of prediction formulas
in which the factors could be given their appropriate weights. It
may turn out that informed judgments, without the use of formulas,
are a better device; but in that case, the element leading to the con-
sistent overestimation of length of trial should be detected and
eliminated.
Second, an effort should be made to determine more precisely
which cases are most likely to settle out of court and which cases are
most likely to go to trial. This would require the same sort of empiri-
cal study, using observed cases and extrapolating to the future. The
determination could be rather crude, at least in the beginning; but it
would then be possible to construct a more rational pool of cases
scheduled to be tried in a given time period, since a better balance
could be achieved between cases likely and unlikely to reach the
trial stage. In any event, it seems quite possible that more cases could
be scheduled for trial than is true at the present time, if the pro-
cedures of the crash program are similar to those usually used by the
Court, on the expectation that the majority of these cases will not in
fact need to be tried.
Both length of trial and settlement out of court might seem to
be matters so filled with chance, so subject to imponderables, that
1967
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
greater accuracy of prediction is impossible. We do not believe this
to be so, however, and we believe that there are regularities to these
events which can be discovered and used by the Court. There will
remain, of course, some margin of error, but within this area of the
unknown the Court could be less wary of scheduling cases which
will have to be postponed. The discomfiture of attorneys, witnesses,
and so on must be weighed against delays in trial; and the latter
may be far more costly in the long run, in terms of the administra-
tion of justice.
Third, reserving the fifth day of the week for judicial duties
other than trial work may be leading to a serious loss of the Court's
efficiency, despite its apparent convenience for the judges. These
judicial duties might better be performed in the gaps left by cases
finished more quickly than expected or cases settled out of court so
near their scheduled trial date that a substitute cannot be found.
This point, however, is rather debatable since these nontrial duties
may require large blocks of uninterrupted time.1" The Chief Judge
has indicated that he does not believe such a solution is workable,
but the issue is worth examining more closely in light of the judges'
experience with such matters and their most efficient habits of time
management.
In short, the Colorado U.S. District Court, like any system of
administration can, we think, benefit from self-analysis, research,
and experimentation - and the willingness to take chances which is
a means of survival for modern organizations. Some of these experi-
ments must inevitably fail and the Court will be criticized. The
ability to withstand such criticism is one portion of the courage
needed to provide our society with the highest levels of justice.
16 See Drucker, How to Manage Your Time: Everybody's No. 1 Problem, 233 HARPER'S,
Dec. 1966, at 56. Finding the appropriate time for the writing of decisions, prelimi-
nary hearings, etc., may be no less difficult than the scheduling of trials.
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